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**THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR  
IN ANALYTICAL REFLECTIONS OF BRITISH OBSERVERS  
(BASED ON MATERIALS FROM  
«THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW» (2022–2024))**

In the article the features of covering the issues of the modern Russo-Ukrainian war in the columns of «The British Army Review» (2022–2024) have been analyzed. At the same time, the methodology of the research is based on the principles of objectivity, scientificity, systematicity and historicism, as well as the application of an interdisciplinary approach. There have been also used the structural functional and comparative historical methods. The scientific novelty of the article consists in revealing the features of covering the full-scale stage of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the pages of «The British Army Review». According to the analysis, the Russo-Ukrainian war issue received a lot more coverage in the British magazine «The British Army Review» starting from 2022.

The number of references to Ukraine and the Russian aggression has increased significantly in comparison to prior years (2014–2021). At the same time, the first (spring)

issue of 2024 has been analyzed, which was dedicated to repelling the offensive on Kyiv in February–March 2022.

Taking into consideration the war in Ukraine, it has been discovered that the magazine's authors realised the drastic need to improve their own armed forces. First of all, emphasizing modernization (managerial, technical), mobilization (improving the process itself taking into account Ukrainian experience), improving communications, the need to accelerate the procurement of air defense systems, long-range weapons, electronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, the need to replenish strategic reserves and generally improve the material and technical base, etc. At the same time, quite objectively assessing the course, consequences of combat and political actions and further intentions. The authors clearly identify Russia as the main threat to peace and security in Europe, hence, recognize the need to prepare for a possible confrontation with it. Emphasizing the fact that deterrence is possible not only nuclear, but also with the help of a powerful army.

**Key words:** British observers, Russo-Ukrainian war, «The British Army Review», «Ukrainian experience», reception.

The issues on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war (2014–2024) were featured across all leading global media platforms, both published and digital. The above-mentioned issue also became the subject of numerous academic, popular scientific, and general interest reviews (written by journalists, scholars, military experts, and the others). It should be noted that the quality of these publications varies in terms of both breadth of topics covered and depth of analytical engagement. The British journal «The British Army Review» provided the in-depth analysis of the war among the authoritative periodicals.

The Russo-Ukrainian war, in general, and particularly its full-scale phase, was the focus of diverse academic and popular scientific studies. The study carried out by Oleksii Pokotylo and Oleksandr Nashyvochnikov, which highlights the origins of the conflict, including the role of the Black Sea Fleet and Moscow's deliberate anti-Ukrainian policy, should be mentioned firstly (Pokotylo, Nashyvochnikov, 2021). Borys Demianenko and Andrii Demianenko analysed the militarisation of education in the occupied Crimean Peninsula, which was marked by an active propaganda promoting military service in the Russian Armed Forces, the cultivation of future bearers and defenders of the «Ruskyi mir» («Russian world») and the formation of the cult of war and violence from 2014 to 2019 (Demianenko, B., Demianenko, A., 2021). Vasyl Ilnytskyi, Volodymyr Starka, and Mykola Haliv did the research on the use of the key propaganda measures carried out by Russia during the preparation for armed aggression against Ukraine (Ilnytskyi, Starka, Haliv, 2022). Ivanna Chobit and Viktoriia Boichenko covered the information warfare issue as one of the hybrid warfare's aspects in Ukraine (Чобіт, Бойченко, 2022). Mykola Haliv, Vasyl Ilnytskyi, and Oresta Karpenko studied the issues on Russia's genocidal policy towards the Ukrainians in the Ukrainian mass media (2022–2024) (Галів, Ільницький, Карпенко, 2024). Vasyl Ilnytskyi, Mykola Hlibishchuk, Volodymyr Starka, and Mykola Haliv did their research in the context of information warfare (Ільницький, Глібішук, Старка, 2022; Ільницький, Старка, Галів, 2022). Borys Drohomiretsky made an attempt to analyse historiographic studies of modern Russo-Ukrainian war (Дрогомирецький, 2022). There were made efforts by Vasyl Ilnytskyi and Olesia Kutska in order to periodise the war from 2014 to 2022 in the scientific publications (Ільницький, Куцька, 2023). Mykola Haliv, Vasyl Ilnytskyi, and Olesia Kutska also analysed the domestic historiographical

discourse regarding the nature and periodisation of the conflict (Галів, Ільницький, 2023; Ільницький, Куцька, 2023). Larysa Yakubova (Якубова, 2023) and Serhii Plokhii (Плохій, 2023) studied diverse dimensions of the war thoroughly. Vasyl Ilnytskyi and Roman Tsaryk covered the memory policy formation and implementation regarding the war (Ільницький, Царик, 2024а; Ільницький, Царик, 2024b; Ільницький, Царик, 2025). Mykola Haliv's and Vasyl Ilnytskyi's studies are the theoretical and methodological basis (Ilnytskyi, Haliv, 2022; Haliv, Ilnytskyi, 2023; Haliv, Ilnytskyi, 2021). Oksana Medvid analysed the reflection of the full-scale stage of the Russo-Ukrainian military conflict by the Polish journalists (Медвідь, 2022). The Polish reception of the Russo-Ukrainian war was studied in historiographical terms a number of times (Masnenko, Telvak, Yanyshyn, Telvak, 2021). Vitaliy Telvak and Vasyl Ilnytskyi analysed the peculiarities of the understanding of the full-scale stage of Putin's aggression by the staff of one of the most authoritative European analytical institutions, the Warsaw-based Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies (Telvek, Ilnytskyi, 2023; Ilnytskyi, Telvak, 2024). The Russo-Ukrainian war was studied on the pages of the scientific journals such as «Eastern European Historical Bulletin» and «Military Scientific Bulletin» by Antonina Boichuk, Nataliia Ilnytska, and Nazarii Zadorozhnyi (Бойчук, Ільницька, 2023; Задорожний, Бойчук, 2023). The issue on the Russo-Ukrainian war was covered extensively in the columns of «The New York Times». It was Yuriy Ofitsynsky, who analysed the publication and identified the main thematic areas (Офіцинський, 2018). Yuriy Ofitsynsky and Liliya Hrynyk analysed the issues on the Russo-Ukrainian war in modern theses (Офіцинський, Гриник, 2023). The need to analyse the publication «The British Army Review» determines the relevance of our study.

The periodical «The British Army Review» is published by the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research. The editor of the journal, Andrew Simms, served at the Ministry of Defence for twelve years and produced a significant number of reports from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. This journal serves as a platform for professional discussion of key military issues that are of direct interest to both private soldiers and high-ranking officers. Furthermore, the journal is considered to be an integral part of the British service members training, preparing them to counter future threats. The authorship is represented broadly by the professional military personnel (of all ranks), subject matter experts, and writers with a keen interest in military affairs. In general, the published material (small publications – up to 3,000 words) does not contain confidential information, only analytical opinions (well illustrated) of the authors about military experience, tactical and strategic tasks aimed at the future improvement of military forces.

It should be noted that the issue on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war was addressed (to a greater or lesser extent) in the publications since 2014. However, due to the full-scale stage of the Russo-Ukrainian war there was a significant increase regarding the focus in the texts on Ukraine and the preparation of its armed forces to face new challenges. The majority of the authors focused on the lessons learned and conclusions drawn from the combat operations. There have been published six issues (No. 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, and 187) since February 2022. There were published 58 texts and 6 introductory articles, reviews and overviews during the years of 2023–2024. The first issue in this series (No. 182, spring 2023) focused on serious mobilization efforts. In his introductory article, General Patrick Sanders emphasized the particular importance of enhancing readiness for emerging threats due to the Russian aggression. According to General, it was recommended to develop the resilience and competitiveness of the army and accelerate planned modernization in

order to prevent war in Europe (Sanders, 2023, s. 4). In general, almost the entire issue is devoted to the mobilization and development of the British army in the context of threats, which emerged due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine. There were the following authors: Chief of the General Staff, General Patrick Sanders, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, Major General Charles Collins, Professor Matthias Strohn, PhD Andrew Monaghan, Brigadier General (retired) Iain Harrison, Professor Peter Wilson, Major General (retired) PhD Andrew Sharpe, Captain Jamie Robson, Director of Policy and Research at the Army Families Federation, Michelle Alston, a graduate student at King's College London (specialization: military studies) Charlie MacCallum, Major, MA International Relations William George (Regular Army) and Captain, Visiting Fellow at the General Staff Military Science Research Group at Joint Royal Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Master of International Relations at Staffordshire University, Master of Business Administration at the University of Warwick Patrick Hinton, Major (Grenadier Guards) (GREN GDS) James Taylor, economic historian Chris Miller. Almost all authors explain the relevance of their texts by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Hence, Major General Charles Collins defined the priority issues and tasks of the British army in the context of the war in Ukraine – a long-term concentration on the fight against terrorism shifted the emphasis in the training of military personnel (first of all, preparation for fighting under conditions of large-scale armed conflicts has receded into the background). The main priority areas for improvement, in his opinion, are air defense, long-range weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, and the formation of appropriate military reserves (Collins, 2023, s. 6). The author emphasizes the erroneous assertion that Russia will suffer such a defeat in Ukraine, from which it will not be able to recover for decades. Major General Charles Collins also emphasized that the experience of Ukraine proved the need for a well-trained and equipped army. Therefore, the primary need to prevent the spread of war in Europe is based on deterrence (not only with nuclear weapon), in which ground forces are an important component (Collins, 2023, s. 7). Taking everything into consideration, he acknowledges that it is important to review the provision, develop the military industrial complex, cooperate with allies, modernize military equipment rapidly, evolutionary change («preserving what was effective from the industrial era and using the best of the latest technologies»), improve data processing and communication technologies, etc. (Collins, 2023, s. 8).

Professor Matthias Strohn prepared an extensive publication in the same Issue in which he analysed the examples of mobilization campaigns, in particular, in Germany in the 1930<sup>s</sup> and 1940<sup>s</sup>, and their experience from a historical perspective (Strohn, 2023, s. 10–13).

Doctor Andrew Monaghan analysed the causes and consequences of the mobilization (September 21 – October 28, 2022) in the Russian Federation (Monaghan, 2023, s. 14–15). Hence, drawing conclusions that mobilization testified not only the made attempts to solve numerous issues that the Russian army faced on the battlefield, but also to a serious increase in tasks to achieve all goals, he exposed all the complexities of this process (misalignment of the military and political leadership, problems in command and logistics, lack of technical means, lack or low-quality provision of conscripts, errors in the inclusion of people (elderly, sick, with existing exemptions, etc.), the impact of mobilization on the country's economy, etc.) (Monaghan, 2023, s. 16–19).

Another author emphasized the need and urgency to improve the military capabilities of Western allies in view of Russia's reform of the armed forces and their preparation for

future armed conflicts (Harrison, 2023, s. 20). At the same time, he placed significant emphasis on improving the defense industrial complex. Therefore, it is summarized that the experience of combat operations in Ukraine poses specific tasks of modernizing warfighting capabilities, resilience on the battlefield (Harrison, 2023, s. 24).

Charlie McCallum, a Master's Degree student at King's College London, wrote about Russia's use of migration as a weapon against the West. He stated clearly that the attempt to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure is aimed at demoralizing the population, provoking new waves of the Ukrainian migration to the EU, and creating vast deserted areas unsuitable for living during the winter months. Due to the influx of people, in particular, emigration in EU countries, there will be a significant tension with housing, medicine, education, etc. (MacCallum, 2023, s. 43). In addition to the migration crisis, the author also wrote about the issue with food exports, the blocking of which by the Russian Federation was aimed at creating pressure on Europe and Ukraine, the hope that the threat of famine (in the poorest countries) will force the lifting of sanctions or even the cessation of the military support by Europe for Ukraine (MacCallum, 2023, s. 44). According to the author, there was another issue – the migration crisis, which could have a very serious escalation, in particular, a direct conflict between the Polish and Russian military, as well as create obstacles to the movement of NATO forces through the Suwałki Corridor (connecting Poland and the Baltic countries) to support Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the event of the Russian aggression against them (MacCallum, 2023, s. 45).

William George, Major, Master of International Relations and Patrick Hinton, Captain, Visiting Fellow of the General Staff of the Military Sciences Research Group at the United Royal Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Master of International Relations at Staffordshire University, Master of Business Administration at the University of Warwick consider Russia's war against Ukraine as an experience of defending one's own land from the aggressor. They noted not only the power of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also the quality of weapons provided by Western countries and NATO since 2014 (George, Hinton, 2023, s. 47). In addition, they wrote about the significant support of the United Kingdom to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other government structures in reforming procurements vulnerable to corruption. One more issue was also covered, in particular, the logistical issue (the weapons and other supplies delivery), which the United Kingdom managed to deal with the other European partners in the most optimal way (George, Hinton, 2023, s. 48). The issue on the possibilities of restraining Russia was raised (since economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure did not deter it, instead the presence of NATO troops, in the author's opinion, would, on the contrary, help confirm the narrative about Russia's struggle with the West for both internal and external consumers) (George, Hinton, 2023, s. 49–51).

The next Issue 183 (Summer 2023), is dedicated to preparing for future threats that could potentially arise in the nearest future. It is about improving management – reducing the number of headquarters, especially on the front line, ensuring tactical and operational freedom, maneuverability, preserving the lives of servicemen, coordinating operations with allies, taking into account shortcomings and weaknesses, etc. In Issue 183, the authors emphasize the reform of all structural units of the armed forces (in particular, command and control systems) taking into account the experience of Russia's war against Ukraine. The materials are also supplemented with photo illustrations from Ukraine. Almost all authors motivate the relevance of the proposed changes in the Russo-

Ukrainian war. The articles were submitted by Commander of the field army, Lieutenant General, Ralph Wooddisse, Major General, Chief of Staff of the Field Army Colin Weir, Director Land Warfare Centre, Major General Chris Barry and Chief of Staff of the Land Warfare Centre, Colonel Matt Lewis, Colonel, Commander of the group of experiments and tests Toby Till, Commander 1<sup>st</sup> Deep Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team Neil Budd, Lieutenant Colonel of Royal Logistic Corps Jez Pattinson, Colonel, Commander Field Army Understand Group Nat Haden, James Sladden, Lieutenant Colonel James Chandler, Major Mark Davies, Major Sophie Longstone (Corps of Royal Engineers), Major, Squadron Commander Giles Moon (the British Army Cavalry Regiment Her Majesty's Royal Lancers). In particular, Lieutenant General Ralph Wooddisse writes about the ongoing war in Ukraine, and therefore there is the need for urgent preparations for war («this evening») (Wooddisse, 2023, s. 4).

We would like to emphasize the interview (his own research was supposed to be published separately, in another issue) of an associate member of the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research James Sladden «How Ukraine Prepared for War in 2022». In order to study in detail the specifics of the Russo-Ukrainian war, he visited the front lines in Ukraine many times, collected field materials, and studied the practice of military combat. In the interview, he notes the extraordinary resilience of the Ukrainian military, which has repeatedly dispelled experts' predictions of the Kremlin's victory. He was especially impressed by the initiative of ordinary Ukrainians on February 24, 2022, in defending their own state (Sladden, 2023, s. 34). He notes that artillery made a significant contribution to holding positions, stopping the Russians, destroying pontoon bridges, hitting enemy units, etc. It is interesting to note that even during his studies, he was skeptical of lectures on artillery, tanks, and trenches, considering these means of warfare obsolete (instead, he focused on improvised explosive devices, small arms, psychological influences, etc.). However, the experience gained in Ukraine has convinced him and shown the importance of these means (Sladden, 2023, s. 36).

Another author, Major Mark Davies, analyzing the experience of Ukraine, writes that currently the armed forces of Great Britain have significantly fewer countermobility skills and capabilities, and he also emphasizes the ambiguity in the assertion of the presence of «combat relevance» for deterrence or operation under conditions of a high-intensity conflict. He carefully recalls a whole series of combat operations in the Russo-Ukrainian war and highlights the peculiarities of tactics (Davies, 2023, s. 46–47). In the article, Major Sophie Longstone also notes a number of negative factors that indicate the collapse of the world order (the Russian aggression against Ukraine, refugees drowning in the English Channel, growing levels of homelessness, poverty, climate change and weather disasters, the revival of ethno-nationalism, etc.) (Longstone, 2023, s. 50).

The next, small special Issue 184 was prepared by Major General (retired) (Chief Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research) Doctor of Science Andrew Sharpe. Based on historical experience, he writes about the war in Ukraine, emphasizing that if neither side can seize, hold, or use the initiative, a «dead end» occurs. That is, he considers the operational situation that arose in the military operations in Ukraine as of the summer of 2023 to be a «dead end», and it is too early to call Russia a «spent force». After all, Russia holds 20 % of Ukraine's territory (rich in natural resources) and it will be very difficult to oust it from the territories of the Crimea and Donbas, which were seized back in 2014. At the same time, Andrew Sharpe writes that frozen conflicts are ordinary dead end that



become prolonged and less resolved. In order to change (turn around) this, it is necessary to consider not only tactical and operational mechanisms, but also the broader regional and global contexts (Sharpe, 2023, s. 4).

Andrew Sharpe notes that Russia has a very long tradition of combating using «active measures» (cyberattacks, attacks on critical infrastructure, assassinations and attempted assassinations, interference in democratic processes, disinformation, propaganda, proxy forces, civil unrest, etc.). At the same time, Russia does not distinguish between «supra-threshold» and «sub-threshold» operations. That is why, in a confrontation with Russia, a party that refrains (moral or strategic points of view) from using similar measures remains at a very disadvantageous position (Sharpe, 2023, s. 14). He provides quite a few recommendations and notes factors that will help influence the way out of the «dead end»: to avoid «freezing» (which may temporarily stop the bloodshed, but will not solve the underlying problems), expanding the support of friends and allies, in the absence of opportunities for tactical victory and further operational gains, it is better not to go on the offensive, but instead to expand one's own capabilities, to use any opportunity to inflict damage on the enemy, flexibility in managing strategic goals (if operational goals are successful), tightening economic sanctions, suspicion of Putin in war crimes, etc. (Sharpe, 2023, s. 15).

No less representative and authoritative authorship made Issue 185 (Autumn 2023). In particular, among the authors there is the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sharon Nesmith, Chief of Army Futures, Major General James Bowder, Colonel, Assistant Head Concepts of Army Headquarters, Chris Coton, Senior Research Fellow, RUSI, Doctor of Science Jack Watling, Assistant Head of Research and Experimentation, Colonel Tim Wright, Assistant Head Strategy and Force Design, Colonel Nick English, Chief Land Analyst at Dstl Paul Elrick, Co-founder, Magazine Editor «Military Strategy», a former infantryman William F. Owen, Brigadier General, Advisor to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom Gerhard Wheeler, Lieutenant, Department Commander at the Intelligence Analysis Centre of the Land Forces Jonathan Burden, Major Robb Bloomfield, Andrew Simms, Major Simon Swindells.

Issue 185 is the final one in 2023 and it is a logical continuation of the two previous ones – 182, dedicated to urgent mobilization, and 183 – preparation for the «struggle today» and in the next few years. In particular, this issue examines the programmes «Wavel» and «Future Warrior», which reveal the preparation for combat in the coming decades (Nesmith, 2023, s. 4).

Colonel Nick English and Chief Land Analyst at Dstl Paul Elrick describe the significant result of the use of small unmanned aerial vehicles in the Russo-Ukrainian war (English, Elrick, 2023, s. 20–23). In his text, William F. Owen, writing about the false lessons of the modern Russo-Ukrainian war, notes that the military affairs of both sides are actually two or three generations behind, taking into account the current standards of competent, well-trained armies. In the publication, he provides recommendations for the successful professional training of cadets for war under new conditions (Owen, 2023, s. 24). At the same time, the author considers the importance of Ukrainian experience for the British army and the feasibility/possibility of its use by others. Comparing the Arab-Israeli wars with the war in Ukraine, he notes a sharp contrast precisely because of outdated equipment and poor training that does not meet NATO standards. The author tries to refute the thesis about Ukrainian «lessons». In particular, he rejects the uniqueness

of the use of UAVs, referring back to the years of First World war, the Arab-Israeli wars, the Vietnam war, when these means were also used for both reconnaissance and combat operations, the author also indicates limited technical capabilities (in particular, the DJI Mavic). William F. Owen considers the impact of drones exaggerated compared to other, even older technologies (e. g., radar). At the same time, he emphasizes that even before February 2022, the British Army had a clear understanding of modern warfare and a developed concept, but a number of its areas were not funded (Owen, 2023, s. 26). The main conclusion he draws from observing modern conflicts is readiness for war. That is why, William F. Owen states that the British army should use reconnaissance, guidance, target designation (Owen, 2023, s. 27).

Instead, Major Robb Bloomfield, describing the struggle in cyberspace, writes about Ukraine's volunteer IT army, which has demonstrated real effectiveness. The Russo-Ukrainian war highlighted the need for cyber defense and effective cyber warfare (Bloomfield, 2023, s. 40–41). Andrew Simms continues this topic, writing about the specifics of creating Ukraine's IT army (after a full-scale invasion). In particular, Andrew Simms notes effective cyberattacks on the Russian infrastructure and sites, intelligence, the construction system (attack and defense units), organization (definition of goals and objectives) and work efficiency (over 700 attacks occurred in 15 months), etc. (Simms, 2023, s. 42–44). Emphasizing that the IT army closely cooperates and coordinates its actions with the army (which is not always easy due to the choice of targets), it also uses connections with government agencies, big technology companies, etc. (Simms, 2023, s. 44).

In the article Major Simon Swindells acknowledges the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the British foreign policy. Under these conditions, both the United Kingdom and its allies need to take measures to strengthen collective security. However, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, on the one hand, united the UK and its allies, and on the other hand, it reflected certain shortcomings – the emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region. Major Simon Swindells also emphasizes the expansion of tasks in the Euro-Atlantic region, especially in the Baltic and Black Sea areas, in order to free up the US resources in Europe and strengthen their positions in the Indo-Pacific region in confrontation with China (Swindells, 2023, s. 48–49).

The authorship expanded in Issue 186 (Spring 2024) significantly. The reflections were published by Commander ARRC, Lieutenant General Nick Borton, Deputy Chief of Staff Plans, Allied Joint Force Command Naples Major General John Mead and Deputy Chief of Staff Plans, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum Major General Mark Pullan, Deputy Chief of Staff Transformation, HQ Allied Land Command in Izmir, Turkiye, Brigade General Chris Gent, Deputy Chief of NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, Italy, Major General Jez Bennett, Head of Strategy Department, Brigade General David Bickers, Chief of Staff, ARRC, Major General Mike Keating, Colonel, Assistant Head Strategy, Army Strategic Centre Hugo Lloyd and Major, NATO Land Special Operations Forces Strategic Coherence Staff Officer SO2 Alasdair Docherty, Head of Conflict Research, Professor Andrew Stewart, Lieutenant General (retired) Paul Newton, Major James Cowen, Lieutenant Colonel Héloïse Goodley, Royal Navy Reserve Bill Young, Major General (retired) Simon Hutchings, the US Army, Major Rocco P. Santurri III.

Major General John Mead and Deputy Chief of Staff Plans, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, Major General Mark Pullan, write about the lack of a plan and even a split in understanding the degree of threat to the Alliance from Russia. Considerable



importance was attached to the approximation of national plans with NATO plans in order to have a full-fledged opportunity to respond (priority deep pinpoint strike, joint fire strikes, integration of high-tech space and cyber capabilities) (Mead, Pullan, 2024, s. 7–8).

Brigadier General David Bickers stresses NATO's conceptual and strategic renewal after February 2022 (Bickers, 2024, s. 13). The experience of the 2022 mobilization in the Armed Forces was studied quite carefully, therefore, a number of corrections were even made to the functioning of the Armed Forces, which concerned training, formation of reserves, equipment, logistics, management (increasing the ability to conduct combat operations, optimization, reassignment, regrouping), lethality, resilience, air defense, etc. (Bickers, 2024, s. 15).

Major General Mike Keating projects the likely format of the future conflict with Russia. Accordingly, he assumes that Russia will use the same format as in Ukraine (being ready to lose a huge number of personnel and material resources, using political and economic levers, while waging an information war in parallel). Instead, NATO, in his opinion, should use its own key advantages: the quality of personnel (soldiers and officers), technological superiority, intellectual resource (a coalition of 31 countries) (Keating, 2024, s. 19). Like the previous author, he notes that the Russian aggression has stimulated a review of the concept of protection and defense of NATO member countries. Emphasizing the significant transformation of the Alliance's Special Operations Command – from more than twenty years of concentration on the fight against terrorism to combat activities to protect the Euro-Atlantic space (Keating, 2024, s. 19).

From information about the war in Ukraine and Gaza, Lieutenant General (retired) Paul Newton draws conclusions, noting the rapidly changing nature, the lack of a «safe rear area», due to constant attacks on military and civilian objects (hundreds of kilometers from the front line), etc. (Newton, 2024, s. 36).

Lieutenant Colonel Héloïse Goodley raises another equally important component of the war in Ukraine – respect for human rights. Emphasizing that the war disrupted the usual way of life, studying, and work, causing not only physical but also psychological trauma. Particular emphasis is on children who have suffered significant trauma caused by the war (illegal transportation of children from the occupied territories to Russia and Belarus, russification, etc.) (Goodley, 2024, s. 45). The author also focuses on other serious violations – human trafficking, sexual violence. The emergence of the refugees problem (over eight million people) and internally displaced people (5,6 million people) (Goodley, 2024, s. 45). Another problem, in her opinion, is the protection of cultural heritage. She emphasizes its targeted destruction by Russia in order to erase the national identity and uniqueness of Ukraine (Goodley, 2024, s. 46).

Major General (retired) Simon Hutchings, writes about the demands of the war in Ukraine and the corresponding weaknesses in the British logistics, some of which he defines as going far beyond the simple need for ammunition replenishment. The Ukrainian experience points at the Russian strategic and tactical failures precisely because of excessive frivolity in logistical preparation (Hutchings, 2024, s. 52). He defines the importance of logistics preparation long before the conflict and the protection of logistics chains, the effectiveness of their functioning during the war. Deterrence is possible under the condition of potential opportunities to wage war, supported by effective logistics (Hutchings, 2024, s. 53). The US Army, Major Rocco P. Santurri III notes that engaging people in the military is a difficult task, faced by both Britain and the US. However, his main message is that

«the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the specter of a global war back to Europe» (Santurri, 2024, s. 56–57).

The authors of the special Issue (No. 187, Spring 2024) are a former British military man, historian, conflict analyst, advisor to the BBC, CNN and ITN, and a member of the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine James Sladden. The second co-author is Liam Collins, Bachelor in Mechanical Engineering (Aerospace Engineering) at the United States Military Academy at West Point, MA in Public Affairs and PhD (Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs). The third co-author is Ben Connable, PhD, Senior Foreign Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and independent researcher and author. He received a Master's degree at the Naval Postgraduate School and a doctorate in military studies at King's College London. In a special issue, these authors reveal how the Ukrainian military stopped the Russian army from crossing the Irpin River, and therefore preventing it from reaching the northwestern outskirts of Kyiv in February–March 2022 (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024). The special issue details the battles that took place from February 24 to the end of March 2022 at the Antonov airport, and then near the Irpin River (in the Horenka area), Irpin, Moshchun, and Huta Mezhyhirska (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 6). The authors rightly emphasize the importance, along with recording people's memories, of visiting the battlefield (to reconstruct the circumstances of the events), identifying and recording artifacts that may be lost. It is through the battlefield research that Western militaries gain an understanding of the battle specifics. For the authors of the publication, this is an example of a human will, coherence, and adaptability of the military and civilians, whose actions defied all predictions (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 7).

The researchers describe the main goals and plans of the Russian invaders, the directions of attack, and the forces trained. They emphasize that the main emphasis was on the rapid seizure or elimination of the legally elected government (through an initial special forces operation and an airborne operation), then signing a surrender and establishing a puppet government (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 8–9).

The main and additional forces of the defenders of Kyiv are described in no less detail (the 72<sup>nd</sup> mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with all units, the 4<sup>th</sup> operational brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, separate units of the 80<sup>th</sup> Airborne Assault Brigade, the 95<sup>th</sup> Airborne Assault Brigade, the 24<sup>th</sup> separate assault battalion «Aidar», artillery from the 128<sup>th</sup> separate mountain-assault brigade, the Georgian Legion, the «Omega» Special Operations Command, the 3<sup>rd</sup> separate special forces regiment, National Guard of Ukraine, «Azov» regiment, national police, territorial defense forces, etc.) (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 10). Very detailed descriptions of the geographical features of Kyiv region are provided – surrounding towns, their population, rivers and waterways, bridges, communication routes, distances between them, airports (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 10, 12–13). There is a fairly meticulous reconstruction, battles for the airport (almost minute-by-minute), blasting of the dam and flooding of the territory (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 24).

In their conclusions, the authors state that the first days of the Russian invasion were truly tense and decisive, as the military had not yet blown up bridges and dams, established positions around Kyiv, had not had time to bring up human, technical, and combat resources, etc. And in the first days, the Russians, with better preparation and knowledge of the terrain, could break through to the capital. However, the Russian troops

did not expect such powerful resistance, even in the weakest areas of defense. We agree with the interviewers that it was owing to the flooding of the lowlands near Kyiv that it was saved: «The 72<sup>nd</sup> Brigade and the Irpin River saved Kyiv» (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 49). The authors also emphasize the importance of local enthusiasts who, together with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, were able to win the battle for the Irpin River. They cite examples of the most vivid stories of people who were civilians and on February 23, on February 24 they entered into battle with the Russian professional military personnel (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 50). In total, 40 people (8 civilians and 32 military) were interviewed, the military, direct participants in the events, civilians, and witnesses of the events, supplementing the information collected on the battlefields (June and August 2022). Among them there were volunteers, military personnel, and officers (two colonels, one general). The text is supplemented with photo-illustrative and cartographic materials (Sladden, Collins, Connable, 2024, s. 51).

Thus, the analysis shows that the British magazine «The British Army Review» has been paying a lot of attention to the issues of the Russo-Ukrainian war since 2022. Compared to previous years (2014–2021), the number of mentions of Ukraine and the Russian aggression has increased many times over. Moreover, the first (spring) Issue of 2022 was dedicated to repelling the offensive on Kyiv in February–March 2022. The authors of the magazine highlight the need to improve our own armed forces precisely through prism of the war in Ukraine. In particular, modernization (management, technical), mobilization (improving the process itself, taking into account the Ukrainian experience), improving communications, the need to accelerate the procurement of air defense, long-range fire, electronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as replenishing strategic reserves and generally improving the material and technical base, etc., are meant. At the same time, the authors fairly objectively analyze the course, consequences of military and political actions, and further intentions. The authors very clearly identify Russia as the main threat to peace and security in Europe, and accordingly recognize the need to prepare for a possible confrontation with it. Emphasizing that deterrence is possible not only nuclear, but also with the help of a powerful army.

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**РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКА ВІЙНА  
В АНАЛІТИЧНИХ РЕФЛЕКСІЯХ БРИТАНСЬКИХ ОГЛЯДАЧІВ  
(ЗА МАТЕРІАЛАМИ «THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW» (2022–2024))**

Розглянуто особливості висвітлення проблематики сучасної російсько-української війни на шпальтах «The British Army Review» (2022–2024). Використанно структурно-функційний і порівняльно-історичний методи. Зазначено, що наукова новизна статті полягає в розкритті особливостей висвітлення повномасштабного етапу російсько-української війни на сторінках «The British Army Review». Встановлено, що британський журнал «The British Army Review», починаючи із 2022 р., суттєво більше приділяє уваги питанням російсько-української війни.

Доведено, що, порівняно з попередніми роками (2014–2021), кількість згадок про Україну та агресію Росії зросла в рази. Проаналізовано перший (весняний) номер 2024 р., який був присвячений відбиттю наступу на Київ у лютому–березні 2022 р.

Виявлено, що автори журналу актуалізують необхідність удосконалення власних збройних сил саме через війну в Україні, наголошуючи на модернізації (управлінської, технічної), мобілізації (вдосконалення самого процесу із врахуванням українського досвіду), вдосконаленні зв'язу, необхідності пришвидшення закупівлі засобів протиповітряної оборони, засобів для стрільби дальньої дії, засобів радіоелектронної боротьби, безпілотних літальних апаратів, необхідності поповнення стратегічних запасів і загалом покращенні матеріально-технічної бази тощо. Зауважено, що при цьому вони доволі об'єктивно оцінюють перебіг, наслідки бойових і політичних дій та подальші наміри. Стверджено, що автори чітко визначають Росію основною загрозою миру та безпеці в Європі, а відповідно визнають необхідність підготовки до ймовірного протистояння з нею, наголошуючи, що стримування можливе не тільки ядерне, а й за допомогою потужної армії.

**Ключові слова:** британські оглядачі, російсько-українська війна, «The British Army Review», «український досвід», рецепція.