Втрати Російської Федерації у техніці та живій силі в перший рік повномасштабного вторгнення на територію України

This study investigates the scale of personnel and military equipment losses suffered by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during 2022, resulting from the failure to achieve the initial strategic objectives of the armed aggression against Ukraine. Based on official data from the General Staff of the AFU, open sources, and analytical conclusions of leading international centers, the chronology and intensity of combat operations within the framework of three major strategic campaigns (the first and second defensive operations and the first offensive operation) have been reconstructed. Russian manpower losses during the year reached tens of thousands, with daily casualties of up to a thousand killed and wounded during peak periods – figures that can be considered unprecedented for modern warfare.

The article characterizes the specific nature of combat in the Kyiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Kherson, and Kharkiv directions and examines the ratio of Russia’s equipment losses – tanks, armored vehicles, aviation, air defense systems, naval assets, electronic warfare means, and logistical infrastructure. Special attention is given to the role of Ukraine’s use of precision-guided weapons (HIMARS, «Javelin», NLAW) and reconnaissance drones as key factors in achieving asymmetric advantage. Particular focus is placed on Russian losses during organized assaults, including the so-called «meat-grinder attacks» in the Bakhmut sector.

The study concludes that the considerable loss of both manpower and equipment fundamentally altered the strategic logic of warfare for the aggressor state. Recorded losses in personnel and armaments reflect critical miscalculations in Russia’s military strategy during the first year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.